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Hogtied to Precedent: The Need for a Statutory Defintion of 
“Agricultural Stormwater Discharge” in the Clean Water Act 
Alt v. U.S. E.P.A., 2013 WL 5744778 
Allison Tungate 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The issue of water pollution has been problematic since the time of 
our ancestors, and the increase in human population has exacerbated the 
problem by opening the door to more bacteria and disease.1  Water pollution 
has plagued the United States since the 1800s.  Despite gradual 
improvements in sanitary living conditions,2 it was not until 1948 that 
Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”).3  Due 
to various issues with the FWPCA,4 in 1972 Congress enacted the Clean 
Water Act (“CWA”), which significantly broadened and restructured existing 
water regulations.5   Congress passed the CWA with the objective of 
restoring and maintaining the “chemical, physical and biological integrity of 
the Nation’s waters.”6 
Generally, the CWA has been lauded as a success because the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”)7 has 
dramatically reduced the amount of pollution from point sources, and in turn, 
has significantly improved the Nation’s water quality.8  Notwithstanding this 
                                                
1 Nonpoint Source Pollution: A Brief History of Pollution, NOAA Ocean Serv. Educ. 
(last modified March 25, 2008), 
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/kits/pollution/02history.html. 
2 Id. 
3 See infra note 41. 
4 See infra note 41. 
5 Summary of the Clean Water Act, EPA (last updated July 26, 2013), 
http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-water-act 
6 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
7 Overview of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, EPA (last modified 
Mar. 12, 2009), http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes/.  
8 Id. 
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accomplishment, many sources of water pollution remain outside the purview 
of the CWA because very little attention has been given to nonpoint 
sources—particularly “runoff from privately owned farmlands and its 
cumulative effects on water quality and aquatic health.”9  While the CWA 
vests the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) with the responsibility 
of regulating “the discharge of any pollutant”10 via the issuance of “pollution-
limiting, technology-based permits,”11 the CWA unambiguously exempts all 
“return flows from irrigated agriculture”12 and agricultural stormwater 
discharges from the NPDES permit program.13  Instead, the burden is 
delegated to the states to establish Best Management Practices (“BMPs”) in 
order to control nonpoint sources, such as agriculture.14  However, the CWA 
merely directs—not requires—states to establish BMPs.15 The EPA has 
identified agriculture operations as being responsible for a majority of 
nonpoint source pollution in the United States, so these exemptions and lack 
of federal oversight are significant.16 
The following comment explores Alt v. U.S. E.P.A.,17 in which the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia 
addressed whether precipitation-caused runoff of litter and manure from a 
farmyard was agricultural stormwater discharge and thus exempt from the 
CWA’s permit requirement.  The main issue was whether the litter 
originating from a concentrated animal feeding operation (“CAFO”), which 
is considered a point source, requires an NPDES permit, regardless of 
whether the runoff was caused by precipitation.  By correctly holding that 
                                                
9 Lara D. Guercio, The Struggle Between Man and Nature-Agriculture, Nonpoint Source 
Pollution, and Clean Water: How to Implement the State of Vermont's Phosphorous Tmdl 
Within the Lake Champlain Basin, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 455, 457 (2011). 
10 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2006). 
11 Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Clean Water Act and the Challenge of Agricultural 
Pollution, 37 VT. L. REV. 1033 (2013). 
12 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1) (2006).  
13 See infra note 50. 
14 Laitos & Ruckriegle, supra note 11, at 1034. 
15 Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(C)-(D). 
16 Nonpoint Source Pollution: Agricultural Operations, NOAA Ocean Serv. Educ. (last 
revised Mar. 25, 2008), 
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/kits/pollution/06operations.html.  
17 979 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. W. Va. 2013).  
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based on the plain language of the CWA, the precipitation-caused run-off of 
litter and manure from Petitioner’s CAFO was agricultural stormwater 
discharge and thus exempt from the NPDES permit program, the court has 
maintained consistency in how the term “agricultural stormwater discharge” 
is applied to CAFOs.  In doing so, the Court has thus taken an appropriate 
step in providing clarity for an ambiguous area of the CWA.   
II.  FACTS & HOLDING 
Plaintiff Lois Alt (“Plaintiff”) and Plaintiff Intervenors American 
Farm Bureau and West Virginia Farm Bureau (“Plaintiff Intervenors”) sought 
a declaratory judgment and other relief after the EPA found Plaintiff in 
violation of the CWA and EPA’s implementing regulations.18  Subsequently, 
the Potomac Riverkeeper, West Virginia Coalition, Waterkeeper Alliance, 
Center for Food Safety, and Food & Water Watch (“Defendant Intervenors”) 
intervened as defendants. 
Plaintiff operated Eight is Enough Farm, a CAFO in Old Fields, West 
Virginia.19  The CAFO consisted of eight poultry confinement houses, which 
were equipped with ventilation fans, a litter storage shed, compost shed, and 
feed storage bins.  Plaintiff’s CAFO activity, which consisted of a poultry 
growing operation and the storage of manure, litter, and raw materials, 
occurred under one roof.20  
Plaintiff implemented management practices and procedures to 
minimize the amount of manure and litter exposed to precipitation in her 
farmyard.21  Specifically, Plaintiff took the following precautionary 
measures: raised poultry in confined poultry houses; stored manure, litter, 
and composted mortalities in covered sheds; stored feed in covered bins; and 
cleaned ventilation fans and shutters in such a way as to prevent the 
collection of dust from being deposited in the farmyard.22  During transfer 
operations, which involved loading trucks to haul away litter or moving litter 
                                                
18 Id. at 703.  
19 Id. at 704. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 704-705. 
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out of the confinement houses to the storage shed, Plaintiff exercised 
reasonable care in cleaning up any manure or litter that may have spilled 
from the trucks.23  Plaintiff conducted litter transfers and loading operations 
only during dry weather, and scraped and swept the loading areas at the 
confinement houses and storage sheds both during and after the litter 
transfers.24 
Despite these precautionary measures taken by Plaintiff, some 
particles of manure and litter from the confinement houses were tracked or 
spilled onto Plaintiff’s farmland.25  Additionally, the ventilation fans from the 
confinement houses blew dust composed of manure, litter and dander, as well 
as feathers, onto the farmyard.26  When fallen precipitation made contact with 
the particles, dust, and feathers from the confinement houses, runoff 
containing the materials flowed across a neighboring green pasture and into 
the Mudlick Run.27  Plaintiff did not have a permit pursuant to the CWA or 
corresponding West Virginia state law authorizing discharges into the 
Mudlick Run.28 
Consequently, on November 14, 2011, the EPA asserted its regulatory 
authority over stormwater runoff stemming from Plaintiff’s farmyard.29  The 
EPA issued a “Findings of Violation and Order for Compliance,” finding 
Plaintiff’s poultry production is a CAFO that “has discharged pollutants from 
man-made ditches via sheet flow to Mudlick Run during rain events 
generating runoff without having obtained a National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit.”30  The EPA concluded that Plaintiff 
was in violation of the CWA and EPA’s implementing regulations.31  As a 
result, EPA informed Plaintiff that the organization could bring both a civil 
                                                
23 Id. at 705. 
24 Id. 




29 Id. at 705. 
30 Id.  
31 Id. 
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and criminal action against her for her illegal discharges and ordered Plaintiff 
to apply for a permit.32 
In response, Plaintiff and Plaintiff Intervenors moved for summary 
judgment, arguing any precipitation related discharges containing manure 
and litter emanating from Plaintiff’s farmyard are exempt from the CWA 
since they qualified as agricultural stormwater discharge.33  The EPA argued 
the Court lacked jurisdiction since the issue had been addressed by the EPA 
in its 2003 CAFO Rule, which was affirmed in Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. 
USEPA.34   The EPA also argued the agricultural stormwater exemption 
applies only to discharges from land application areas under the control of the 
CAFO.35 
The District Court held that because Plaintiff and Plaintiff Intervenors 
did not challenge the 2003 CAFO Rules pertaining to discharges from land 
application areas, the action was not barred by Waterkeeper36 or 33 U.S.C. 
section 1369(b).37  The Court applied the “arbitrary and capricious” standard 
promulgated by the Administrative Procedure Act, and held the runoff from 
Plaintiff’s CAFO operation was exempt from regulation by the EPA because 
it was agricultural stormwater discharge.38  Accordingly, when there is 
precipitation-caused runoff of litter and manure from a farmyard, such runoff 
is considered agricultural stormwater discharge and is thus exempted from 
the CWA’s permit requirement.39 
 
 
                                                
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id.; see infra note 36. 
35 Id. 
36 Id.; see also, Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 399 F.3d 486 (2nd Cir. 2005). 
37 Plaintiff and Plaintiff Interveners did not challenge the validity of the regulations as 
written, so § 1369(b) was not a jurisdictional bar to the suit; see also, Alt v. U.S. E.P.A., 
979 F. Supp. 2d at 705. 
38 Alt, 970 F. Supp. 2d. at 706, 715; see 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966). 
39 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 715.   
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  History of CWA 
In 1948, Congress enacted the FWPCA, the primary predecessor of 
the CWA, in an effort to combat water pollution caused by increased post-
World War II industrial activity and “lower expenditures on wastewater 
treatment.”40  Recognizing water pollution control was primarily the 
responsibility of state and local governments, Congress assigned the states 
the task of developing water quality standards and implementation plans.41  
Additionally, the FWPCA encouraged states to enact uniform laws and 
interstate compacts.42  The federal government was given the secondary role 
of bolstering local pollution control programs by funding research on water 
pollution and providing loans and federal grants to help the financing of 
treatment facilities and water pollution control programs.43  
Although a federal statute, the FWPCA gave the federal government 
limited jurisdiction and any enforcement that was created was “awkward and 
time consuming.”44  The FWPCA was fraught with enforcement issues, and 
so in 1972, Congress amended the Act to relieve the states of the requirement 
of instituting their own individual water pollution discharge regulations.45  
Instead, Congress established the federally mandated National Pollutant 
                                                
40 William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States-State, 
Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 235 (2003). 
41 Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More Than Five-and-A-Half Decades of Federal 
Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 527, 531-32 (2005). 
42 Id. at 530-31. 
43 Id. at 530. 
44 “Federal enforcement power was . . . limited . . . to cases where interstate pollution 
actually endangered the health or welfare of persons in a neighboring state. Polluters were 
immune to federal action as long as they only endangered local residents or refrained from 
activities that actually threatened public health . . . . The government could only seek an 
injunction after completing a lengthy, three-step process.” Andreen, supra note 40, at 238; 
see Murchison, supra note 41, at 531 (“. . . [T]he federal government could proceed only 
with the approval of state officials in the state where the discharge originated and after a 
complicated series of notices, warnings, hearings, and conference recommendations.”). 
45 Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. U.S. E.P.A., 635 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”)46 permit program, which 
effectively transformed the FWCPA into what is today known as the “Clean 
Water Act.”47  As the heart and soul of the CWA, the NDPES permit 
program does not focus on the effect of the discharge but instead concentrates 
on non-compliance with the specific limits in the permits.48  In doing so, the 
permit program aims to improve the identification and enforcement of 
pollution requirements.49  
Substantively, the NDPES permit program authorizes the discharge of 
pollutants,50 which would otherwise be illegal under section 301(a)51 of the 
CWA.52  Applying exclusively to the “discharge of pollutants,”53 the NPDES 
permit program requires any facility that adds new pollutants from its 
industrial process through a point source into a stream or lake to have a 
permit,54 which is issued by the EPA or one of the forty-six states authorized 
to do so.55  A point source is defined as “any discernible, confined and 
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, 
                                                
46 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2014). 
47 Nat'l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 742-43; “Clean Water Act” was not formally 
acknowledged until the amendments of 1977. Murchison, supra note 41, at 536. 
48 See CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (establishing administrative, civil and criminal 
penalties for violations of substantive restrictions and limitations provided in an NPDES 
permit). 
49 Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 
31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 413 (2007). 
50 “The term ‘discharge of a pollutant’ and the term ‘discharge of pollutants’ each means . . . 
any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, . . . any addition of 
any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other 
than a vessel or floating craft.” CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2014). 
51 The discharge of a pollutant is unlawful unless in compliance with various sections of the 
Act. See CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1). 
52 Gaba, supra note 49, at 413.  
53 CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 
54 Gaba, supra note 49, at 415.  
55 These 46 states are authorized to administer permits for the discharge of pollutants into 
navigable waters instead of the NPDES program.  If authorized to oversee its own program, 
a state will become its own NPDES permit-issuing agency, as opposed to the 
EPA.  However, the EPA still retains authority to oversee the issuance of such permits.  The 
EPA also preserves the right to veto any issuance of a permit as well as enforce any violation 
of the CWA or of a state-issued discharge permit. Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 
743; see also, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c), (d), and (i) (2014). 
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tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated 
animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged.”56  Facilities with a permit may only 
discharge pollutants pursuant to several substantive restrictions.57  
B.  Agricultural Stormwater Discharge Exemption 
In response to the NPDES permit program, the EPA promulgated 
regulations exempting certain classes of point sources from the permit 
requirements.58  These exemptions included all CAFOs below a certain size; 
all non-feedlot, non-irrigation agricultural point sources; and separate storm 
sewers containing only storm runoff uncontaminated by an industrial or 
commercial activity.59  The EPA rationalized, “In order to conserve the 
[EPA’s] enforcement resources for more significant point sources of 
pollution, it [was] necessary to exclude these smaller sources of pollutant 
discharges from the permit program.”60  In Natural Resources Def. Council v. 
Train,61 the District of Columbia Circuit Court was faced with the issue of 
whether these promulgated exemptions were within the purview of the EPA 
Administrator.  Based on the definition of “point source” at the time,62 the 
court held that “the EPA Administrator lacked the authority to exempt point 
                                                
56 CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2014); see supra note 23. 
57 Effluent limitations outlined in the NPDES permit stipulate the amount of specific 
pollutants that may be discharged from a point source.  All point sources must meet 
technology-based limitations, which are determined by what is considered 
technologically and economically achievable based on existing technology.  Point 
sources are also subject to water quality based effluent limitations, which are 
implemented to ensure attainment of state water quality standards. Gaba, supra note 49, 
at 416. 
58 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
59 Id.; see, 40 C.F.R. § 125.4 (1975) (listing of all the exempted point sources). 
60 Costle, 568 F.2d at 1372-73. 
61 396 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975). 
62 Originally, the term “point source” was defined as “any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, 
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or 
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” Costle, 568 F.2d at 
1372; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2014). 
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source discharging pollutants from regulation,” thus voiding the 
regulations.63 
In response to Natural Resources Def. Council v. Train, in 1987 
Congress amended section 1362(14) by adding an exemption to the statutory 
definition of a point source.64  Supplementing the original definition of “point 
source,” the new definition clarified that the “term does not include 
agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated 
agriculture.”65  Despite the addition of the exemption, Congress did not 
explicitly define “agricultural stormwater discharge.”66  
In subsequent years the term was interpreted according to its plain 
meaning.  For instance, in Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. 
Southview Farm,67 the Second Circuit determined the “agricultural 
stormwater discharge” exemption applied to any discharges that were the 
result of precipitation, and nothing in the language of the statute indicated the 
exemption only applied to stormwater that was discharged where it would 
naturally flow.68  Similarly, in Fishermen Against the Destruction of the 
Environment v. Closter Farms, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit determined 
regardless of whether stormwater was being pumped into a lake or flowing 
naturally, the exemption still applied.69 
C.  CAFOs’ Regulatory Background 
At roughly the same time the EPA was establishing the NPDES 
permit program generally and its exemptions, the agency adopted the first set 
                                                
63 Alt, supra note 17, at 707. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.; “The term ‘point source’ means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, 
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well discrete fissure, 
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating 
craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.  This term does not include 
agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.” Id.; see 
also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2014).  
66 Alt, supra note 17, at 707. 
67 34 F.3d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1994). 
68 Id. at 120-21. 
69 300 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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of NPDES regulations addressing CAFOs in 1976.70  Animal feeding 
operations are facilities that house, raise, and feed animals until they are 
ready for transport to processing facilities that prepare meat for shipment and 
consumption.71  Because CAFOs house such a large population of animals, 
this collectively leads to the production of millions of tons of animal manure 
every year,72 which in turn pose major risks to the environment and public 
health.73  Animal waste pollutes navigable waters by adding “excess 
nutrients, organic matter, and pathogens,”74 which poses serious health risks 
to humans.75 
Because of the substantial risk of water pollution, the EPA’s 1976 
regulations required that CAFOs wanting to permissibly emit discharges 
would have to obtain a permit largely based on the number of animals housed 
at the facility.76  Failure to obtain a permit for a CAFO would result in civil 
or criminal liability.77    
                                                
70 Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. U.S. E.P.A., 635 F.3d 738, 742-43 (5th Cir. 2011). 
71 Sara R. Reichenauer, Note, Issuing Violations Without Tangible Evidence: Computer 
Modeling for Clean Water Act Enforcement, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1011, 1019 (2010). 
72 Id. at 1019-20. 
73 Id. at 1020; see EPA Preamble to the Final Rule, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards for 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7179 (estimating that AFO 
facilities create approximately five hundred million tons of manure annually, which the EPA 
estimates to be more than three times more than humans generate in the United States). 
74 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Animal Agriculture: Information on Waste Management 
and Water Quality Issues 1 (1995), http:// www.gao.gov/archive/1995/rc95200b.pdf; see 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 
Fed. Reg. 2960, 2976-79 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (detailing the pollutants associated 
with CAFO waste). 
75 Charles Duhigg, Health Ills Abound as Farm Runoff Fouls Wells, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
17, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/us/18dairy.html?scp=1&sq=clean%20water%C20ac
t% 20agriculture&st=cse (noting that animal waste pollution can cause human ailments 
such as diarrhea). 
76 Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 743-44 (specifying that “large” CAFOs—those 
with 1,000 animals or more—were required to have an NPDES permit to discharge 
pollutants; “medium” CAFOs—those with 300 to 1,000 animals—were required to have a 
permit if they emitted a certain types of discharges; and most “small” CAFOs—300 animals 
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1.  The 2003 Rule & Waterkeeper 
After the promulgation of the 1976 regulations, which clarified the 
type of operations that would be considered CAFOs, the NPDES 
requirements, and the effluent limitation guidelines, the EPA was sued in 
1989 for “failing to publish a plan to revise existing effluent limitations for 
the industry pursuant [to the CWA].”78  The court in Natural Resource 
Defense Council v. Reilly79 mandated that the EPA update and enforce its 
CAFO regulations in order to comply with section 1314(m) of the CWA.80  
As a result of the litigation, on January 21, 2001, the EPA “proposed to 
‘revise and update’ the first set of CAFO regulations.”81  The proposed 
revisions sought to remedy inadequate compliance with already-existing 
policy and adapt the new rules to reflect changes in the animal production 
industries.82  Specifically, the EPA aimed to modify the regulations to reflect 
the “trend toward fewer but larger operations,” which consequently resulted 
in “large-scale discharges from the facilities” and “continued run-off.”83 
                                                                                                                     
or less—typically were not required to have a permit, but possibly would have to if the small 
CAFO emitted certain discharges after an onsite inspection and notice); see also 41 Fed. 
Reg. 11458 (Mar. 18, 1976). 
77 Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 744. 
78 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 399 F.3d 486, 495 (2d Cir. 2005); see 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1314(m) (1987) (establishing that the EPA Administrator must publish in the Federal 
Register a plan outlining the schedule for the annual review and revision of promulgated 
effluent guidelines); see also Consent Decree, as amended, NRDC v. Reilly, modified sub 
nom., NRDC v. Whitman, No. 89-2980 (D.D.C. 1/31/1992) (resolving the suit by “a consent 
decree in which the EPA agreed to propose new effluent limitation guidelines for the swine, 
poultry, beef and dairy subcategories of CAFOs.”). 
79 983 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
80 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 494; see 66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 2976-79 (proposed 
Jan. 12, 2001); see also Preamble to the Final Rule at 68 Fed. Reg. 7181. 
81 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 494. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. (citing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and 
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 
66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 2972 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001)). 
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After the Notice and Comment period,84 the EPA promulgated its 
Final CAFO Rule (“2003 Rule”) on February 12, 2003.85  The 2003 Rule 
reflected the revised permitting requirements and effluent limitations of 
CAFOs by broadening the number of animal feeding operations subject to the 
NPDES permit program as CAFOs.86  The 2003 Rule required all CAFOs to 
apply for an NPDES requirement, regardless of whether or not they 
discharged.87  However, the 2003 Rule allowed for CAFOs to request from 
the EPA a “no potential discharge” determination if they could prove so, 
thereby exempting them from the NPDES permit program.88  The 2003 Rule 
also required CAFOs applying for a NPDES permit to develop and 
implement a site-specific Management Plan (“NMP”), which required a 
determination of “best management practices” (“BMPs”) in order “to ensure 
adequate storage of manure and wastewater, proper management of 
mortalities and chemicals, and appropriate site-specific protocols for land 
application.”89 
Additionally, the 2003 Rule added requirements applicable to land 
application of manure.90  In section 122.23(e), the 2003 Rule provided that: 
The discharge of manure, litter or process wastewater 
to [navigable waters] from  a CAFO as a result of the 
application of manure, litter or process wastewater by the 
CAFO to land areas under its control is a discharge…and 
subject to NPDES  permit requirements, except where it is 
an agricultural stormwater discharge as provided in 33 U.S.C. 
Section 1362(14).91 
                                                
84“The EPA received approximately 11,000 public comments on the proposed rule…as well 
as an additional 450 or so comments following the publication, in November 2001 and July 
2002, of Notices of Data Availability.” Id. at 495. 
85 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 495; see 40 C.F.R. §§ 9, 122, 123, 412. 
86 Laitos & Ruckriegle, supra note 11, at 1059. 
87 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 708. 
88 Id. 
89 Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 744 (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7176 (Feb. 
12, 2003). 
90 Id. 
91 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e) (2003). 
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However, if CAFOs land-applied waste was done “in accordance with 
site-specific nutrient management practices that ensure appropriate 
agricultural utilization of the nutrients in that waste,”92 a precipitation-related 
discharge of manure, litter, or process wastewater from land areas under the 
control of a CAFO was an agricultural stormwater discharge.93  Thus, the 
2003 Rule “expanded the definition of exempt ‘agricultural stormwater 
discharge.’”94 
Consequently, various aspects of the 2003 Rule were challenged in 
court.95  In Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A.,96 petitioners97 requested 
the Second Circuit “vacate the 2003 Rule’s ‘duty to apply’,” contending it 
was outside the scope of the EPA’s authority.98  Agreeing with the 
petitioners, the Second Circuit held that the EPA impermissibly required 
CAFOs to apply for a permit based merely on the potential of discharging 
pollutants99 and ordered the EPA to remove the requirement that all CAFOs 
apply for NPDES permits.100  The Second Circuit rationalized that the plain 
language of the CWA did not give the EPA authority to impose obligations 
on CAFOs to show “no potential to discharge.”101   
The Second Circuit rejected the petitioners’ contention that the 2003 
Rule’s exclusion of agricultural stormwater discharge resulting from land 
application violated the CWA’s definition of “point source.”102  Petitioners 
argued that according to the language of the CWA, all discharges originating 
from a CAFO, which is a point source under the Act, require a NPDES 
permit “notwithstanding the fact that agricultural stormwater discharges are 
                                                
92 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 495-96. 
93 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e) (2003); see, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2014). 
94 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 708. 
95 Laitos & Ruckriegle, supra note 11, at 1059. 
96 399 F.3d 486 (2nd Cir. 2005). 
97 There were both “environmental” and “farm” parties who either petitioned or 
intervened in Waterkeeper.  For a complete list of the petitioners, see Nat’l Pork 
Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 744. 
98 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 708. 
99 Id. (citing Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 505). 
100 Laitos & Ruckriegle, supra note 11, at 1059. 
101 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 506. 
102 Id. at 507; Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 704. 
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otherwise deemed exempt form regulation.”103  The Second Circuit 
disagreed, stating despite the ambiguity in the CWA as to whether CAFO 
discharges could ever constitute agricultural stormwater, the congressional 
intent and precedent buttressed the EPA’s argument that excluding 
agricultural stormwater discharge resulting from land application as a point 
source was a permissible construction of the CWA.104 
2. The 2008 Rule & Guidance Letters 
On June 30, 2006, in response to the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc.,105 the EPA proposed a new rule requiring a 
CAFO owner or operator to apply for a permit only if the CAFO actually 
discharged or proposed to discharge pollutants.106  On November 20, 2008, 
the Final 2008 Rule (“2008 Rule”) was published.107  The 2008 Rule clarified 
the term “duty to apply,” determining that each CAFO operator had to make 
a case-by-case decision as to whether there would be discharges due to their 
operations.108 
As is customary after promulgating a new and complex regulation, 
the EPA issued three guidance letters.109  Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant 
Administrator for the EPA’s Office of Water, sent a guidance letter to 
Senator Thomas R. Carper of Delaware and another to then-congressperson 
Michael N. Castle of Delaware.110  James D. Giattina, Director of the Water 
Protection Division for Region 4, sent a letter to Jeff Smith, an executive for 
Perdue Farms, Inc.111 The guidance letters sent to the Delaware Congress 
members explained the CWA prohibited the discharge of pollutants from a 
CAFO without a permit.112  The guidance letters further stated, “[t]he term 
                                                
103 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 507. 
104 Alt, 979 F.Supp.2d at 709 (citing Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 507-09; Nat’l 
Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 745). 
105 See supra notes 61-7. 
106 Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 745-46 (citing 71 Fed. Reg. at 37,744). 
107 Alt, 979 F.Supp.2d at 709. 
108 Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 746. 
109 Id. at 747. 
110 Id. at 747-48. 
111 Id. at 748.  
112 Id. 
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pollutant is defined very broadly in the CWA…Potential sources of such 
pollutants at a CAFO could include…litter released through confinement 
house ventilation fans…Any point source discharge of stormwater that comes 
into contact with these materials and reaches waters of the United States is a 
violation of the CWA unless authorized by a permit.”113  
 The letter sent to Smith by Giattina was in response to Smith’s 
question regarding “whether operators of dry litter farms need to apply for a 
permit ‘because of potential runoff from the production area, [and if] so, are 
there examples of dry poultry litter operations having a discharge?’”114  The 
guidance letter explained that because the term “pollutant” is defined 
broadly, theoretically CWA regulations could apply to litter released through 
house ventilations fans.  The guidance letter addressed the agricultural 
stormwater exemption, stating it “applies only to precipitation-related 
discharges from land application areas…where application of manure, litter, 
or process wastewater is in accordance with appropriate nutrient management 
practices…and not to discharges from the CAFO production area.”115 
As a result of these guidance letters, the Fifth Circuit was asked to 
decide if these guidance letters constituted final agency action in National 
Pork Producers Council v. U.S. E.P.A.116 Applying the Bennett two-prong 
test,117 the Court held that the guidance letters did not constitute final agency 
action because the letters were merely restating the prohibition against 
discharging pollutants without an NPDES permit, thus giving advice or 
“guidance” to a question posed to the EPA.118  First, the court reasoned that 
although “guidance letters can mark the ‘consummation’ of an agency’s 
decision-making process…[t]here must also be evidence that the guidance 





117 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (citing the two-prong test established by the 
Supreme Court, which is used to in determining whether an agency action is final; first 
the action must mark the “consummation” of the agency’s decision-making process—it 
cannot be interlocutory, and second the action must be one by which “rights or 
obligations have been determined” or from which there will be legal consequences.) 
118 Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 756. 
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letters have made a substantive change in the regulation of CAFOs.”119  
Further, the court stated the second prong of the Bennett test states that in 
order to constitute final agency action, guidance letters must also affect rights 
or obligations or create new legal consequences.120  Applying this second 
prong, the court reasoned despite the fact the letters put an obligation on 
petitioners to obtain a permit if they discharged manure or litter through 
ventilation fans, the letters neither created any new legal consequences nor 
affected their rights.121 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
The Alt court first began its analysis by determining the appropriate 
standard of review to be whether the EPA’s decision was “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the 
law,” as set forth by the Administrative Procedure Act.122  Because the 
standard is narrow, the court deferred only to the administrative record that 
was complied by the EPA.123  After establishing the appropriate legal 
standard, the court began by resoundingly rejecting what appeared to be the 
central assumption of EPA’s position: the agricultural stormwater discharge 
exemption had no meaning at all from the time it was added to the CWA in 
1987 until the promulgation of new regulations in 2003.124  The court stated, 
“It is a basic tenet that ‘regulations,’ in order to be valid, must be consistent 
with the statute under which they are promulgated.”125  The court showed the 
inconsistency of the EPA’s assumption with the CWA by engaging in 
statutory deconstruction of the term  “agricultural stormwater discharge.”   
First, the court noted the CWA never defined the term “agricultural 
stormwater discharge.”126  Accordingly, the Court stated the term should be 
given its ordinary meaning as Congress found it unnecessary to define it.127  
                                                
119 Id. at 755-56 (internal citations omitted). 
120 Id. at 756. 
121 Id. 
122 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
123 Alt v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706 (N.D. W. Va. 2013). 
124 Id. at 710. 
125 Id. (citing Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, --- U.S. -----, 133 S.Ct. 
1326, 1334 (2013), quoting United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977)). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
HOGTIED TO PRECEDENT 
472
Next, the court looked at the term “discharge of a pollutant,” which is defined 
by the CWA as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any 
point source.”128  Thus, the court acknowledged that the general prohibition 
in section 1311(a)129 and the requirement to obtain an NPDES permit in 
accordance with section 1342130 only applies to discharges from a point 
source.131 
Because the NPDES permit requirement hinges on whether a 
discharge comes from a point source, the court next looked to the meaning of 
“point source,” defined by the CWA as:  
[A]ny discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, 
including but not limited to  any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, 
conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, 
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other 
floating craft,  from which pollutants are or may be 
discharged.  This term does not include agricultural 
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated 
agriculture.132 
The court recognized CAFOs are generally considered a point source, 
but the CWA specifically excludes “agricultural stormwater discharges,” 
regardless of whether they are associated with a CAFO or any other type of 
point source.133  Therefore, the court concluded the discharge of pollutants 
from a CAFO required an NPDES permit unless the discharge is considered 
an “agricultural stormwater discharge.”134   
Consequently, the court determined that because neither the CWA nor 
the EPA’s implementing regulations defined “agricultural stormwater 
discharges” in relation to CAFO farmyard runoff, the onus of interpreting the 
                                                
128 Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (2014). 
129 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2008) states that the discharge of pollutants is illegal except when in 
compliance with effluent limitations; see 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (defining “effluent 
limitations”). 
130 33 U.S.C. § 1342 outlines the NPDES permit system.   
131 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 710. 
132 Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added).  
133 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 710. 
134 Id. 
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statutory term fell to the court.135  Relying on precedent, the court determined 
the terms “agricultural” and “stormwater” should be given their ordinary 
meanings in accordance with their common usage.136  Additionally, the court 
looked to the Fourth Circuit, which established the two principles of statutory 
construction are “plain English and common sense.”137  Applying these two 
principles, the court was led to the “inescapable conclusion that Ms. Alt’s 
poultry operation is ‘agricultural’ in nature and that the precipitation-caused 
runoff from her farmyard is ‘stormwater.’”138 
In support of defining the terms by their ordinary meaning, the court 
relied on similar decisions made by other jurisdictions.  First the court cited 
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA,139 a Second Circuit case which took the 
same approach when reviewing the EPA’s general interpretation of the 
agricultural stormwater exception in the context of CAFO land application 
areas.140  In Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., the Second Circuit held that 
“dictionaries from the period in which the agricultural stormwater exception 
was adopted defined ‘agriculture’ or ‘agricultural’ in a way that can 
permissibly be construed to encompass CAFOs.”141  Regarding 
“stormwater,” the Second Circuit agreed with the EPA that the term should 
be defined as “precipitation-related discharge[s].”142  As a result of this 
similar analysis conducted by the Second Circuit, the court established that 
contrary to the EPA’s position, the agricultural stormwater discharge 
exemption clearly existed prior to the promulgation of the 2003 
regulations.143  
Furthermore, the court in the instant case looked to another Second 
Circuit case, Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm,144 
which entailed a citizen suit against a large dairy farm that spread manure 
                                                
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 710-11 (citing BP v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006); Perrin v. U.S., 444 U.S. 37, 
42 (1979)). 
137 Id. at 711. 
138 Id. 
139 399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005). 
140 Alt v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701, 711 (N.D. W. Va. 2013). 
141 Id. at 711 (quoting Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 509). 
142 Id. (quoting Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 508). 
143 Id. at 711. 
144 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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over its fields, allowing the manure to run off into surface water during 
periods of both precipitation and non-precipitation.145  To decide whether this 
runoff met the statutory exemption for agricultural stormwater, the Second 
Circuit looked to the legislative history and context of the CWA.146  In 1987, 
Congress simultaneously created the CWA’s new stormwater permitting 
program and the agricultural stormwater exemption.  As a result of this 
legislative history, the Second Circuit deduced that permits would not be 
required for agricultural stormwater under the new stormwater permit 
program.147  The court then interpreted the statutory phrase “agricultural 
stormwater” by giving the words their common-sense meaning, resulting in 
the conclusion that “a discharge of liquid manure would not be exempt just 
because it happened to be raining at the time, but [rather] a discharge of such 
manure caused by precipitation would be exempt.”148 
Similarly, the court looked to Fishermen Against the Destruction of 
the Environment v. Closter Farmers, Inc.,149 an Eleventh Circuit case that 
determined that water pumped into Lake Okeechobee by Closter Farms was 
“agricultural stormwater.”  Citing the CWA’s specific exemption of 
“agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigation 
agriculture,”150 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause these water 
discharges are not considered to be point sources, there is no requirement that 
a property owner discharging these waters have an NPDES permit.”151  
Additionally, the court looked to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in National Pork 
Producers Council v. U.S. EPA,152 which determined “[t]he 2003 Rule also 
expanded the definition of exempt ‘agricultural stormwater discharge’ to 
include land application discharge, if the land application comported with 
                                                
145 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 711. 
146 Id. (citing Concerned Area Residents, 34 F.3d at 120).  
147 Id. at 711-12 (writing that “[b]ecause Congress mandated comprehensive regulations 
of certain forms of industrial and municipal stormwater run-off under 33 U.S.C. § 
1342(p), one can infer that Congress wanted to make it clear that agriculture was not 
included in this new program.” (quoting Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. 
Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 1994))). 
148 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 712.  
149 300 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002). 
150 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2014). 
151 Alt v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701, 712 (N.D. W. Va. 2013) (citing Fishermen, 300 F.3d 
at 1297; see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342). 
152 635 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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appropriate site-specific nutrient management practices.”153  Using these 
similar rulings, the court in the instant case further justified its conclusion 
that the agricultural stormwater exemption existed prior to the 2003 
regulations, despite the EPA’s presumed position.154  
Next, the court considered whether the EPA was entitled to any type 
of deference.155  Because Congress never defined the term “agricultural 
stormwater discharge” and the EPA never promulgated any regulations 
defining the term other than in reference to land applications, which 
expanded the preexisting exemption,156 the court determined that deference 
was inappropriate under Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC and Auer v. Robbins.157  
The court also determined that limited deference would be given to the 
guidance letters only to the extent that they had the power to persuade.158  
The court declared that any possible deference was tempered by the fact that 
the EPA’s position regarding the exclusivity of the land application area 
regulations changed from its prior position in 2003.159  Thus, the court 
concluded “there is more to the agricultural stormwater exemption than as set 
forth in the 2003 land application area regulations.”160   
After determining the land application area regulations were not the 
exclusive source of the agricultural stormwater exemption and limited 
deference would be given to the EPA, the court then addressed EPA’s 
                                                
153 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 712 (citing Nat’l Council of Pork Producers, 635 F.3d at 744). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 The Court cited the preamble to the 2003 Rule, in which the EPA stated that “[the] 
EPA does not intend its discussion of how the scope of point source discharges from a 
CAFO is limited by the agricultural storm water exemption to apply to the discharges that 
do not occur as a result of land application of manure, litter, or process wastewater by a 
CAFO to land areas under its control….” Id. (quoting National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards 
for CAFOs, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7198 (Feb. 12, 2003)). 
157 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 712 (citing Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); 
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)). 
158 Id.; see U.S. Dept. of Labor v. N.C. Growers Ass’n, Inc., 377 F.3d 345, 353-54 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)); see also Christensen v. 
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001). 
159 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 712-13; see Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense 
Center, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1337-38 (2013) (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166-67 (2012)). 
160 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 713. 
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argument that stormwater from a CAFO’s production area is not entitled to 
the exemption and Plaintiff’s discharge was industrial in nature rather than 
agricultural.161  First, the court agreed with the Respondent and rejected 
Plaintiff’s argument that the farmyard area of the Alt farm was not part of the 
CAFO, noting that the grassy areas between the poultry houses were part of 
the production facility.162  The CWA defined “facility” to include any “point 
source…including land or appurtenances thereto.”163  The court reasoned that 
Plaintiff’s interpretation of the term “facility” to exclude this area 
contravened the plain language of the regulatory definition.164  As a result, 
the court established that the term “facility” applied to any CAFO and the 
land appurtenant thereto—including the farmyard.165  The court noted 
however that the inquiry could not stop there since the EPA itself had stated 
that “[n]othing in the statutory language or legislative history indicates that 
Congress did not mean to include agricultural stormwater discharges from a 
CAFO in this exclusion.”166 
As a result, the court next turned to Defendant’s argument that “the 
production area of a CAFO is ineligible for the agricultural stormwater 
discharge exemption.”167  However, the court did not even consider whether 
this assertion was pertinent because the area at issue was the Alt’s 
“farmyard,” not a “production area.”168   Citing the regulatory definition of 
“production area,”169 the court reasoned that the areas between Plaintiff’s 
poultry houses clearly did not qualify as “the animal confinement area, the 
manure storage area, the raw materials storage area, [or] the waste 
                                                
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2013)). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. (quoting EPA, NPDES Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitation Guidelines and 
Standards for CAFOs, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7197 (Feb. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, and 412)). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. (quoting “Production area means that part of an AFO that includes the animal 
confinement area, the manure storage area, the raw materials storage area, and the waste 
containment areas.  The animal confinement area includes but is not limited to open lots, 
housed lots, feedlots, confinement houses, stall barns, free stall barns, milkrooms, 
milking centers, cowyards, barnyards, medication pens, walkers, animal walkways, and 
stables…” 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(8) (2012)). 
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containment areas.”170  The court reasoned a “farmyard” does not include 
areas where animals are confined.171 Thus, the Alt “farmyard” was not a 
“production area.”172 
To justify this assessment, the court cited the EPA’s 2003 Response 
to Comments, in which the EPA noted the definition of “production area” 
does not explicitly include the entire farmyard.173  Thus, the court argued it 
was clear the EPA had long interpreted the agricultural stormwater 
exemption as being inapplicable to runoff occurring within a confinement 
area, manure storage area, and other features deemed as the CAFO 
“production area.”174  The Court pointed out that because of this long held 
interpretation, many farmers like Plaintiff kept their animals under the same 
roof and maintained covered structures for activities such as manure storage 
and composting in order to be considered a “farmyard” and not a “production 
area.”175 
Further, the EPA argued that although the manure and litter were in 
the farmyard, they originated from the production area, which would thus 
render such discharge ineligible for the stormwater exemption.176  Relying on 
Waterkeeper once again, the court rejected this argument.  In Waterkeeper, 
the Second Circuit established that the CWA should be read “as generally 
authorizing the regulation of CAFO discharges, but exempting such 
discharges from regulation to the extent that they constitute agricultural 
stormwater.”177  The Second Circuit further explained that such discharges 
are exempt from regulation under the CWA “even when those discharges 
came from what would otherwise be point sources.”178  Based upon this 
rationale, the court reasoned manure and litter in the farmyard would remain 
                                                
170 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 713. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 713-14 (citing EPA, 2003 Responses to Comments (EPA-HQ-OW-2002-0025-
0060), at 1-661 (Excerpt CAFONODA-600021-1) (May 25, 2005)). 
174 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 714. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. (quoting Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 399 F.3d 486, 507 (2nd Cir. 
2005)). 
178 Id. (quoting Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 507). 
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in place only until stormwater carried the particles to navigable waters, which 
would then result in the discharge of a pollutant.179 
After establishing that Plaintiff’s farmyard did not meet the regulatory 
definition of “production area,” the court considered Defendant’s argument 
that in order to employ the agricultural stormwater discharge exemption, the 
discharge must have an agricultural purpose.180  The court established the 
only requirement is the discharges be agriculture related. 181 Consequently, 
the determined that because the incidental manure and litter from Plaintiff’s 
farmyard was related to the raising of poultry, such discharges were related to 
agriculture.182  Again, the court referred back to Waterkeeper, in which the 
Second Circuit recognized that by promulgating the agricultural stormwater 
exemption, “Congress was affirming the impropriety of imposing...liability 
for agriculture-related discharges triggered not by negligence or malfeasance, 
but by the weather—even when those discharges came from what would 
otherwise be point sources.”183 
Finally, the court rejected Defendant’s contention that discharges 
stemming from Plaintiff’s farmyard are industrial as opposed to agricultural, 
giving three justifications.184  First, the court looked to the Compliance Order 
issued by Defendant to Plaintiff and noted the EPA never once mentioned 
“industrial stormwater.”  Next, the Court relied on Waterkeeper, in which the 
Second Circuit rejected the proposition that CAFOS should be viewed as 
industrial, not agricultural.185  Finally, the Court reiterated that the sole issue 
is whether the stormwater discharges from Plaintiff’s farmyard are exempt as 
“agricultural stormwater discharges,” and if so, exempt from any NPDES 
permit requirements, including industrial stormwater permit requirements.186  
Citing Southview Farm, the court noted that Congress created the stormwater 
permitting program at the same time as the promulgation of the agricultural 
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stormwater exemption, which suggests the intent to explicitly exclude 
agricultural operations form regulation under the stormwater program.187  
V.  COMMENT 
Although the CWA has been lauded as significantly improving the 
nation’s water quality, a wide range of sources continue to pollute and 
contaminate water bodies in the United States.188  Particularly, the EPA has 
identified CAFOs as being a significant contributor to the remaining water 
quality problems.189  Because CAFOs are largely responsible for the 
remaining water pollution in the United States, there is disagreement between 
environmental groups and the agricultural industry as to whether the  
“agricultural stormwater discharge” exemption should apply to CAFOs.190  
Environmental groups argue that because CAFOs are such significant 
contributors to ongoing water pollution, the agricultural stormwater discharge 
exemption should not apply to such operations for the sake of furthering the 
CWA’s goal of restoring and maintaining the “chemical, physical and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”191  
Courts like the District Court in Alt have been faced with the task of 
determining the meaning and breadth of the statutory term “agricultural 
stormwater discharge.”  In Alt, the court explicitly stated that because neither 
the CWA nor EPA’s implementing regulations had defined “agricultural 
stormwater discharge,” past precedent192 required the court to interpret the 
statutory term in accordance with its ordinary meaning and common usage.193  
Based on “plain English and common sense,” the court came to the 
“inescapable conclusion that [Petitioner Alt’s] operation was ‘agricultural’ in 
                                                
187 Id. at 714-15 (citing 34 F.3d 114, 120 (2nd Cir. 1994)). 
188 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent 
Limitation Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 
(CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7176 (Feb. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 
122, 123, and 412). 
189 Id. 
190 Terence J. Centner, Clarifying Npdes Requirements for Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 361, 373 (2006). 
191 Id. at 362.  
192 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 710-11 (citing BP America Production Co. v. Burton (549 U.S. 
84, 91 (2006); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
193 Id. at 711. 
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nature and that the precipitation-caused runoff from her farmyard was 
“stormwater.”194   
In support of its conclusion, the court cited the Second Circuit as 
taking the same approach when reviewing whether the EPA’s interpretation 
of the “agricultural stormwater discharge” exemption applied to CAFO land 
application areas.195   In Waterkeeper, the Second Circuit explained that 
“[d]ictionaries from the period in which the agricultural stormwater 
exemption was adopted define[d] ‘agriculture’ or ‘agricultural’ in a way that 
[could] be permissibly construed to encompass CAFOS.”196  Additionally, 
the Second Circuit agreed with the EPA’s contention that “stormwater” 
meant “precipitation-related discharges.”197  Furthermore, the Alt Court’s 
conclusion that Petitioner’s CAFO is covered by the agricultural stormwater 
discharge exemption is supported by another Second Circuit decision, in 
which the court explained that “[b]ecause Congress had created the 
stormwater permitting program at the same time (1987) that it enacted the 
agricultural stormwater exception” it should be inferred that “Congress 
intended that no permits would be required for agricultural stormwater under 
the new stormwater permit program.”198   
In view of the precedent defining “agricultural stormwater discharge” 
by its plain and ordinary meaning and applying that term to CAFOs, the Alt 
court has taken the logical step by further clarifying the breadth of the 
statutory term.  Because CAFOs play such a prominent role in contributing to 
existing water pollution and given the lack of existing regulations affecting 
agricultural operations, it is imperative to establish a uniform and consistent 
definition of “agricultural stormwater discharge” in order to discern what 
type of activity requires a permit and what type of activity is exempt.  
Specifically, consistent application of the term “agricultural stormwater 
discharge” will allow CAFOs the opportunity to formulate appropriate best 
                                                
194 Id. 
195 Id. (citing Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 509 (2nd Cir. 2005)). 
196 Id. (citing Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 509)). 
197 Id. (citing Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 508). 
198 Id. at 711-12 (citing Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 
F.3d 114 (2nd Cir. 1994)). 
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 21, NO. 2 
481 
management plans and nutrient management plans to significantly reduce, if 
not eliminate, precipitation-caused discharges.   
Although the Alt decision is supported by similar decisions and 
rationale in other jurisdictions, it is worth noting that these courts had their 
hands tied due to the lack of guidance from either the CWA or the EPA’s 
implementing regulations. As noted in Alt, the only guidance the EPA has 
given with regard to how “agricultural stormwater discharge” should be 
defined is with respect to land application.199  In fact, in the preamble to the 
2003 Rule, the EPA stated it “does not intend its discussion of how the scope 
of point sources discharges from a CAFO is limited by the agricultural 
stormwater exemption to apply to discharges that do not occur as a result of 
land application of manure, litter, or process wastewater by a CAFO to land 
areas under its control….”200 Therefore, despite the meritorious argument 
that CAFOs should be exempted from the agricultural stormwater discharge 
exemption because of their significant contribution to water pollution, the Alt 
court was left with no choice but to interpret the law in a way consistent with 
the implementing statute.201  Because Congress found it unnecessary to 
define the term, the court was forced to interpret the term in accordance with 
its ordinary meaning. 
Because the breadth of the “agricultural stormwater discharge” 
exemption is such a contentious issue between environmental groups and the 
agricultural industry, Alt illuminates the growing need for the EPA to issue 
an implementing regulation that further clarifies, if not unambiguously 
defines, the scope of the exemption.  Although the 2003 Rule explains the 
“EPA’s longstanding interpretation that the agricultural stormwater discharge 
exemption is inapplicable to runoff from within a confinement area, manure 
storage area, and similar features deemed to be the CAFO “production 
                                                
199 Id. at 712.  
200 Id.; see 40 C.F.R. §§ 9, 122-123, 412 (2014). 
201 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 713; see Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1334 (2013) 
(quoting United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 (1977) (“It is a basic tenet that 
‘regulations, in order to be valid, must be consistent with the statute under which they are 
promulgated.’”). 
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area,”202 further guidance is needed regarding runoff occurring outside these 
specified areas—like the farmyard in Plaintiff’s case.  
Specifically, the EPA needs to issue a regulation that provides 
definitive guidance as to the scope of the agricultural stormwater discharge 
exemption, while also mandating BMPs and NMPs for all CAFO operators to 
“implement management practices and procedures to reduce the amount of 
manure and litter that will be exposed to precipitation in farmyards.”203  By 
mandating BMPs, the amount of manure and litter in exempted areas of the 
CAFO would be significantly, if not completely, reduced.  In doing so, 
CAFO operators would be held accountable for ensuring their respective 
BMPs are not significantly contributing to water quality problems, while 
being allowed to avoid the NPDES permit program.  Additionally, such a 
regulation would refrain from imposing liability on CAFO operators for 
uncontrollable events—like the weather—while furthering the over-arching 
goal of the CWA.  
Such definitive guidance would likely result in a greater number of 
CAFOs being required to apply for an NPDES permit.  Under the CWA, 
permits are issued “after an opportunity for a public hearing” and further 
states that “permit applications” and the actual permits must be available to 
the public.204  The CWA also provides for requirements regarding public 
notice and public comment, but such hearings are only held if there is a 
“significant degree of public interest.”205  Thus, an unambiguous definition of 
“agriculture stormwater discharge” may broaden the breadth of CAFOs 
required to apply for an NPDES permit, which in turn would require them to 
go through the permit application process.  The agriculture industry might 
oppose such a set definition because this would potentially expose more 
CAFOs to EPA regulations via the NPDES permit program and thus burden 
                                                
202 Id.; see EPA, 2003 Response to Comments (EPA–HQ–OW–2002–0025–0060), at 1–661 
(Excerpt CAFONODA–600031–1) (May 25, 2005).  
203 Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 704.  
204 Gaba, supra note 49, at 417-18; see Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1), 
1342(j) (2014).  
205 Gaba, supra note 49, at 418 (citing Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198, 
216 (1980), in which the Court rejected the argument the CWA mandated a public 
hearing for every NPDES permit application); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.1-.21, 124.51-
.66 (citing the EPA regulations governing permit procedures). 
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and/or temporarily halt agricultural operations.  However, CAFOs required to 
apply for an NPDES permit would only face a small inconvenience of going 
through the process; the time it takes to get a permit depends on the type of 
discharge, but typically the review and approval of an application does not 
take more than a couple of weeks.206 Additionally, as established in Costle v. 
Pacific Legal Foundation,207 public hearings regarding the permits are only 
required when there is a “significant degree of public interest,” which would 
exclude a majority of CAFOs.  Thus, the benefit of improving the nation’s 
water quality significantly outweighs the small cost CAFOs may face in a set 
definition of  “agricultural stormwater discharge,” which is the slight 
inconvenience of applying for a permit. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Alt Court’s decision has further invigorated the notion that 
“agricultural stormwater discharges” are exempt from all point source 
regulations, including CAFOs.  Despite the huge amount of pollution 
stemming from the agricultural industry—especially CAFOs—the 
agricultural stormwater discharge exemption continues to act as a shield 
against liability for inadvertent and uncontrollable discharges of pollutants 
that are weather-related. The Alt Court wisely followed other jurisdictions in 
defining “agricultural stormwater discharge” based upon its plain and 
ordinary meaning, which in turn maintained consistency in how the 
exemption is to be applied.  However, there is an increasing need for the EPA 
to promulgate a regulation that unambiguously defines the scope of 
“agricultural stormwater discharge,” as well as mandates BMPs in order to 
reduce the amount of discharge originating from CAFOs outside a 
confinement area, manure storage area, and similar features deemed to be the 
CAFO production area.  In doing so, the EPA would be taking an affirmative 
step in keeping within the spirit of the CWA by reducing the impact CAFOs 
have on the nation’s water while also giving guidance to, as well as imposing 
liability on, CAFO operators only to the degree that they can implement 
BMPs to control the amount of manure and litter outside the production area. 
                                                
206 SCDHEC, FACT SHEET: GETTING A NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION 
SYSTEM (NPDES) PERMIT (2013), available at 
http://www.scdhec.gov/environment/PermitCentral/FactSheetsNPDES/. 
207 445 U.S. 198, 204 (1980).  
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